

## Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 9 MBFR VIENNA 0071

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF  
FEBRUARY 24, 1976

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0070

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL SESSION  
WITH EASTERN REPS OF FEBRUARY 24, 1976. PARAGRAPHS  
1 THROUGH 6 CONTAINING SUMMARY TRANSMITTED REFTEL.

7. FRG REP AS HOST WELCOMED PARTICIPANTS. DRAWING ON TALKING  
POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, HE SAID THAT, WHEN WESTERN  
REPS HAD INTRODUCED THEIR NEW PROPOSALS ON DECEMBER 16, THEY HAD  
STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THEIR GOVERNMENTS ATTACHED TO  
THESE PROPOSALS. HE WANTED TO EXPLAIN WHY THIS WAS SO.

8. FRG REP SAID THAT, THROUGHOUT THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WESTERN  
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REPS HAD STRESSED THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF DEALING CONSTRUCTIVELY

WITH THE SERIOUS INEQUALITY IN GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THIS INEQUALITY CONSTITUTED THE KEY SECURITY PROBLEM WITH WHICH AN AGREEMENT MUST DEAL. THE FACTS WERE WELL KNOWN. THE EAST HAD APPROXIMATELY 150,000 MORE SOLDIERS IN THE AREA THAN THE WEST. IT HAD MORE THAN TWICE AS MANY TANKS. THESE ADVANTAGES WERE ENHANCED BY THE FACT THAT THE MAJOR WARSAW PACT POWER, THE SOVIET UNION, WAS LOCATED DIRECTLY ADJACENT TO THE AREA AND HAD EASY ACCESS TO IT. THE SOVIET FORCES STATIONED IN THE SOVIET UNION WERE VERY LARGE, WELL EQUIPPED, AND HAD INCREASED STEADILY OVER RECENT YEARS. MANY OF THEM WERE LOCATED ON SOVIET TERRITORY IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THIS SITUATION WOULD REMAIN UNAFFECTED BY AN AGREEMENT. THE TOTAL SIZE AND ARMAMENTS OF THE SOVIET FORCES IN THE USSR WOULD NOT BE LIMITED. HOW COULD THE EAST EXPECT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO OVERLOOK THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE FACTS FOR THEIR SECURITY?

9. FRG REP CONTINUED THAT, EVEN IF THE GROUND FORCES OF BOTH SIDES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WERE TO BECOME EQUAL NOW, THE GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY OF THE SOVIET UNION, PLUS THE FACT THAT THE VERY LARGE FORCES THERE WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO LIMITATION OF THEIR TOTAL SIZE, WOULD STILL BE FACTORS OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE. IN LIGHT OF THIS SITUATION, THE GOAL OF APPROXIMATE PARITY OF GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA WHICH THE ALLIES WERE PROPOSING WAS ACTUALLY A MODEST GOAL, SEEN FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS. CERTAINLY, WESTERN REPS DID NOT SEE HOW ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS GOAL WOULD DIMINISH EASTERN SECURITY IN ANY RESPECT. TO THE CONTRARY, THE RESULTING SITUATION WOULD BE A MORE STABLE ONE FOR EVERYBODY. THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE ENHANCED. FOR THESE REASONS, THE ALLIES HAD MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THESE NEGOTIATIONS THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST DEAL CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITIES. THIS WAS A CARDINAL REQUIREMENT OF THE WESTERN POSITION FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ALLIES DID NOT ENVISAGE ENTERING INTO ANY AGREEMENT WHICH DID NOT MEET THIS REQUIREMENT. THE WEST WOULD ADHERE TO THIS VIEW. TO FAIL TO TAKE THIS FACT INTO ACCOUNT WAS UNREALISTIC.

10. FRG REP SAID THAT IN THE LAST SESSION, AS IN THE PAST EASTERN REPS HAD OBJECTED TO CONSIDERATION OF THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS, AS IF THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WERE SOME ISOLATED REGION, TOTALLY CUT OFF AND REMOTE FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD. EASTERN REPS  
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KNEW THE WEST DID NOT ACCEPT THIS VIEWPOINT BECAUSE IT WAS COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC. BUT SUPPOSE, PURELY FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT, THAT ONE LOOKED AT THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOR A MOMENT AS IF IT WERE AN ISOLATED REGION, CUT OFF FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD. EVEN THEN, WHAT THE EAST WAS PROPOSING WOULD BE HIGHLY INEQUITABLE. EASTERN REPS WERE PROPOSING THAT THE WEST AGREE, IN AN ENDURING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, TO CONTRACTUALIZE THE PRESENT EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN GROUND FORCES. IF A REDUCTION

AREA WERE TO BE CONSIDERED AS AN ISOLATED REGION, HOWEVER ARTIFICIAL IT MIGHT BE TO DO THIS, WHAT FACTORS WOULD REQUIRE THE EAST TO HAVE A CONTRACTUALIZED SUPERIORITY IN SUCH AN AREA? WHAT INTEREST DID EASTERN REPS CONSIDER THE WEST WOULD HAVE IN THAT KIND OF AGREEMENT? HOW WOULD IT ENHANCE STABILITY OR STRENGTHEN SECURITY FOR THE WEST? CLEARLY, THE KIND OF AGREEMENT THE EAST WAS PROPOSING WOULD BRING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO THE EAST AND WOULD DIMINISH WESTERN SECURITY IF APPLIED IN AN ISOLATED AREA. IN THE REAL SITUATION, HOWEVER, WHERE THE REDUCTIONS AREA WAS NOT ISOLATED, THE EAST'S PROPOSAL WOULD DIMINISH WESTERN SECURITY EVEN FURTHER. FRG REP SAID HE THEREFORE REPEATED: THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR AGREEMENT WAS APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES.

11. FRG REP SAID THAT ON DECEMBER 16, THE ALLIES HAD ADDED A SIGNIFICANT NEW ELEMENT TO THE WESTERN POSITION. WESTERN REPS HAD OFFERED TO ADD TO THEIR PREVIOUS PROPOSALS MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON US NUCLEAR WAR-HEADS, NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, AND SURFACE-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS. THE ALLIES HAD DECIDED TO MAKE THIS OFFER AFTER CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION. AFTER TWO YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE EAST HAD NOT ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST DEAL CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE MAJOR GROUND FORCE INEQUALITIES. EASTERN REPS HAD OBJECTED THAT THIS CONCEPT REQUIRED THE EAST TO REDUCE TANKS AND MORE MEN THAN THE WEST. EASTERN REPS HAD ARGUED THAT THE WEST WOULD THEREBY GAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES.

12. FRG REP SAID THE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS HAD SEEN A WAY OF RESOLVING THE IMPASSE, THE "MIXED-PACKAGE" THE ALLIES HAD PROPOSED ON DECEMBER 16. UNDER THIS MIXED-PACKAGE APPROACH, SECRET

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THE COMPONENTS OF THE AGREEMENT -- THE REDUCTIONS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED LIMITATIONS -- WOULD BE DIFFERENT FOR EACH SIDE. IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO PERFORM DIFFICULT ANALYSIS TO UNDERSTAND THIS CONCEPT. UNDER THIS APPROACH, THE ALLIES WERE STILL ASKING

THE EAST TO REDUCE TANKS AND MORE MEN THAN THE WEST. HOWEVER, THE WEST HAD NOW OFFERED TO ADD A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS TO ITS PREVIOUSLY OFFERED REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS. TAKEN TOGETHER, THE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS THE ALLIES WERE OFFERING MADE WHAT THE WEST WAS WILLING TO UNDERTAKE AT LEAST EQUAL TO WHAT IT WAS ASKING FROM THE EAST, AND THEREFORE CLEARLY MADE THE DECEMBER 16 WESTERN PROPOSALS AN EQUITABLE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT.

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13. POLISH REP SAID HE HAD LISTENED CAREFULLY TO FRG REP'S REMARKS. HE THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO ANSWER SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS RAISED BY FRG REP IN THE STATEMENT HE WAS ABOUT TO GIVE. BEFORE DOING SO, HE WISHED TO RECALL THAT EASTERN PARTICIPANTS CONSIDERED THE LAST UNOFFICIAL SESSION OF FEBRUARY 17 AS HAVING BEEN PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT. THIS WAS BECAUSE AT THIS MEETING, A NEW PROPOSAL HAD BEEN PRESENTED ON BEHALF OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. ALSO AT THE LAST SESSION, PARTICIPANTS HAD LISTENED TO CLARIFICATIONS FROM WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES ON THEIR POSITION AS WELL AS THEIR ANSWERS TO SOME EASTERN QUESTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED EARLIER. UNFORTUNATELY, EASTERN REPS HAD NOT RECEIVED THE ANSWERS TO ALL OF THEIR QUESTIONS IN THAT SESSION.

14. POLISH REP SAID THAT, ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, H PROPOSAED TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION ON THE ISSUES WHICH  
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HAD BEEN TOUCHED ON IN THE LAST MEETING. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF DECEMBER 16 STILL MADE IT DIFFICULT TO REACH THE TARGET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND IN THE VIEW OF THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES, DID NOT PROVIDE A BASIS ON WHICH AGREEMENT COULD BE ACHIEVED. THE MAIN EASTERN CONCERNS WERE BASED ON THE CONCEPT THAT ANY AGREEMENT MUST CONTAIN MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS ON THE VOLUME, TIMING, AND METHOD OF REDUCING ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE WESTERN REDUCTION POSITION REMAINED UNACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST, BASICALLY BECAUSE OF THE REDUCTION METHOD IT ENTAILED.

15. POLISH REP SAID HE WISHED ON THE PRESENT OCCASION TO REFER TO THE MAJOR LINES OF THE WESTERN POSITION WHICH EASTERN REPS COULD NOT ACCEPT, BECAUSE THEIR ACCEPTANCE WOULD DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPATING STATES. WESTERN REPS SHOULD CONSIDER THESE REMARKS AS AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION THEY HAD PUT FORWARD IN THE LAST SESSION, AND WHICH HAD BEEN REPEATED BY THE FRG REP ON PRESENT OCCASION, AS TO WHY EASTERN REPS FELT THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH WOULD BRING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO THE WESTERN STATES. POLISH REP SAID HE WOULD ALSO EXPLAIN WHY THE EAST COULD NOT ACCEPT THE WESTERN VIEW THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE NOW READY TO CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS WHICH WERE AT LEAST EQUIVALENT TO THOSE THEY SUGGESTED FOR THE SOCIALIST STATES.

16. POLISH REP SAID EASTERN ARGUMENTS ON THESE POINTS WERE AS FOLLOWS: FIRST, JUST AS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE STILL INSISTING ON SO-CALLED ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, ASSUMING THAT THE SOCIALIST STATES WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE NEARLY THREE TIMES AS MUCH AS THE NATO STATES. THERE WERE NO GROUNDS WHATEVER FOR THIS REQUIREMENT. APPARENTLY, IT WAS A REFLECTION OF THE DESIRES OF SOME NATO MILITARY CIRCLES. BUT IT DID NOT CORRESPOND TO THE OBJECTIVE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE STATEMENTS OF WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES CONCERNING THE ALLEGED EXISTING DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES WERE NOT CONVINCING. ON MANY OCCASIONS EASTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT TO WESTERN REPS AND LATTER HAD NOT DINIED THIS THAT THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES

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IN THE AREA WAS THE OUTCOME OF A LONG, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. THIS HAD RESULTED IN A HIGH CONCENTRATION OF FORCES

IN CENTRAL EUROPE. BUT THE GENERAL RELATIONSHIP OF THE FORCES OF THE WARSAW TREATY AND OF NATO, WHEN ALL TYPES OF FORCES IN THE AREA WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, WAS ONE OF DEFINITE PARITY. IN PARTICULAR, THIS FORCE RELATIONSHIP HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE CONDITIONS FOR A PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS IN EUROPE IN RECENT YEARS. AT PRESENT, WHERE THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN EUROPE WAS IMPROVING, IT HAD BECOME NECESSARY TO DECREASE THE CONFRONTATION OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. HOWEVER, THIS MUST BE DONE ON AN EQUITABLE BASIS, WITHOUT CHANGING THE FORCE RELATIONSHIP. THE CONCEPT OF ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS WAS CONTRARY TO THIS SITUATION AND CONTRARY TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF MUTUALITY AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS.

17. POLISH REP SAID THE SECOND MAIN POINT WAS THE WESTERN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY BENEFITS. THIS COULD BE SEEN FROM THE WESTERN WISH TO REDUCE IN THE FIRST STAGE A SOVIET TANK ARMY OF 68,000 MEN IN EXCHANGE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL FROM CENTRAL EUROPE OF ONLY 29,000 US MILITARY PERSONNEL TAKEN SELECTIVELY FROM VARIOUS MILITARY UNITS. IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD WHY IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SPEAK OF SUCH REDUCTIONS AS EQUIVALENT. EVEN FOR NON-MILITARY PEOPLE, IT WAS EVIDENT THAT A TANK ARMY WAS A LARGE MILITARY FORCE ABLE TO CARRY OUT INDEPENDENTLY SOME MILITARY TASKS ON A BROAD SCALE. MOREOVER, ANY MILITARY UNIT OR FORMATION REPRESENTED A QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT CATEGORY THAN THE SAME NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL NOT IN UNITS.

18. POLISH REP SAID HE WANTED TO ILLUSTRATE THIS BY AN EXAMPLE DRAWN FROM AMERICAN FORCES: IT WAS NOT BY CHANCE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD DECIDED IN PUBLIC LAW 93-365, THE SO-CALLED NUNN AMENDMENT, TO STRENGTHEN ITS ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE THROUGH ESTABLISHING TWO NEW BRIGADES. THIS WAS BEING DONE WITHOUT AN INCREASE IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS THROUGH REDUCING THE SUPPORT PERSONNEL OF VARIOUS UNITS. ONE COULD THUS SEE, ACCORDING TO AMERICAN MILITARY SPECIALISTS, THAT REDUCTIONS MADE THROUGH TAKING PERSONNEL SELECTIVELY FROM CERTAIN UNITS COULD, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, NOT

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DECREASE THE COMBAT POTENTIAL OF THE FORCES INVOLVED. IF THIS WERE SO, HOW COULD ONE COMPARE REDUCTION OF SOLDIERS ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS WITH THE REDUCTION OF A WHOLE TANK ARMY? MOREOVER, THIS REDUCTION WAS NOT ON AN EQUAL BASIS, BUT IN A RELATIONSHIP OF 1 TO 2.5.

19. POLISH REP SAID HIS THIRD POINT WAS THAT THE WESTERN STATES HAD NOT YET CHANGED THEIR POSITION ON SUCH AN IMPORTANT ISSUE AS THE ACCEPTANCE OF REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS

BY NON-US NATO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. BASICALLY, EACH OF THESE STATES, AS HAD BEEN THE CASE FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS, REFUSED TO STIPULATE EVEN IN A GENERAL WAY, THE REDUCTION

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FROM US REP MBFR

COMMITMENTS IT WOULD CARRY OUT IN A SECOND STAGE. STATEMENTS CONCERNING REDUCTIONS BY PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND USSR AIMED AT THE SO-CALLED COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING ALSO DID NOT IMPROVE THE SITUATION. AS EASTERN REPS HAD ALREADY INDICATED, UNDER THE COMMON CEILING, CERTAIN STATES WOULD BE ABLE TO INCREASE THEIR ARMED FORCES IN COMPARISON WITH THEIR PRESENT LEVEL. THIS WAS INJUST AND INEQUITABLE IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SENSE, AND ALSO CONTRADICTED THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF THE TALKS. IN THE MILITARY SENSE, IT MEANT IN FACT THAT REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT ENCOMPASS THE FORCES OF CERTAIN WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES WHICH WERE THE CORE OF THE NATO GROUND FORCES IN WESTERN EUROPE.

20. POLISH REP SAID THAT, WHILE DEMANDING THE REDUCTION OF A

CONSIDERABLE PART OF SOVIET TANKS, NATO PARTICIPANTS REFUSED TO REDUCE THEIR OWN COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES. APPARENTLY, THIS POSITION WAS BASED ON A CERTAIN  
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REASON SINCE IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT WITHIN NATO, STEPS WERE NOW BEING CARRIED OUT TO INCREASE THE COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF NATO FORCES AND TO STRENGTHEN NATO AIR FORCES. FOR INSTANCE, IN THE AMERICAN FORCES THIS APPROACH WAS BEING CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUNN AMENDMENT. THE WEST WISHED TO EXCLUDE FROM REDUCTIONS THE MAJOR PART OF THE QUIPMENT AND ARMAMENTS OF THEIR ARMIES AS WELL AS AIR FORCES IN GENERAL. THE FRG REP HAD SAID IN THE LAST SESSION THAT THE NATO STATES WOULD NOT DECREASE THEIR AIR MANPOWER. ALL THIS WOULD PERMIT NATO STATES TO INCREASE THESE COMPONENTS OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

21. POLISH REP SAID IT COULD THEREFORE BE SEEN THAT THE BASIC POSITION OF THE NATO PARTICIPANTS HAD NOT CHANGED AFTER THE 16 DECEMBER PROPOSAL. THE FACT WAS THAT NATO WAS INSISTING ON UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THIS WAS THE ESSENCE OF THE WESTERN REDUCTION SCHEME, WHICH WAS NOW CALLED THE MIXED-PACKAGE APPROACH. THESE WERE THE MAIN FACTORS MAKING THAT APPROACH UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOCIALIST STATES.

22. CANADIAN REP SAID POLISH REP HAD JUST MENTIONED THAT THE EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD INTRODUCED A NEW PROPOSAL IN THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION OF FEBRUARY 17 AND SOVIET REP HAD SUBSEQUENTLY INTRODUCED THIS PROPOSAL IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 19. CANADIAN REP, DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, SAID THAT, IN STUDYING WHAT HAD BEEN SAID ON BOTH OCCASIONS, SOVIET AND CZECHOSLOVAK REPS HAD CLAIMED REPEATEDLY THAT THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL CONTAINED A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ELEMENTS WHICH TO A VERY LARGE EXTENT MET THE DESIRES EXPRESSED BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES AND THAT EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD DEPARTED IN CERTAIN RESPECTS FROM THE ORIGINAL EASTERN POSITION AND TAKEN OVER MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN APPROACH. THEREFORE, CANADIAN REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK EASTERN REPS TO EXPLAIN PRECISELY IN WHAT RESPECTS THEY CONSIDERED THAT THEIR NEW PROPOSAL MET BASIC WESTERN REQUIREMENTS.

23. CANADIAN REP SAID THAT, AS EASTERN REPS NEW WELL, IT WAS A CARDINAL REQUIREMENT OF THE WESTERN POSITION IN THESE  
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NEGOTIATIONS THAT AN AGREEMENT DEAL CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE GROUND FORCE INEQUALITIES. IN WHAT WAY DID THE EAST'S NEW PROPOSAL MEET THIS REQUIREMENT? THE MAIN FEATURE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS ITS CONTINUED USE OF A REDUCTION CONCEPT WHICH WOULD CONTRACTUALIZE THESE GROUND FORCE INEQUALITIES. THIS APPROACH WAS THE MAIN FEATURE OF THE EAST'S ORIGINAL THREE-STAGE PROGRAM, AND OF EACH AND EVERY ONE OF THE VARIANTS OF ITS FIRST STAGE THAT EASTERN REPS HAD PUT FORWARD SINCE. IN THE FIRST STAGE OF ITS NEW PROPOSAL, THE EAST PROPOSED THAT THE US AND SOVIET UNION EACH REDUCE ITS MANPOWER BY TWO OR THREE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MANPOWER ON ITS SIDE. EASTERN REPS PROPOSED REDUCTION OF CERTAIN US AND SOVIET ARMAMENTS IN EQUAL NUMBERS. AS TO THE SECOND STAGE, THE EAST HAD NOT SUGGESTED A SPECIFIC REDUCTION FORMULA. BUT EASTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT, "AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTIONS IN BOTH STAGES, ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WOULD HAVE REDUCED THEIR ARMED FORCES BY AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE." EVIDENTLY, THEREFORE, THE EAST ENVISAGED EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS IN BOTH STAGES. HOW DID THIS CONSTITUTE ADOPTING SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION?

24. CANADIAN REP SAID THAT, AS EASTERN REPS KNEW, ONE OF THE WEST'S BASIC REQUIREMENTS WAS THAT THE COMMON CEILING TO BE ESTABLISHED AS THE GOAL OF NEGOTIATIONS, AS WELL AS THE NO-INCREASE PROVISION FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PHASES, SHOULD BE OF COLLECTIVE CHARACTER. HOW DID THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL MEET THIS WESTERN INTEREST? WITH REGARD TO ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV HAD CLAIMED IN THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION THAT EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE NOW PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF A TWO-PHASE REDUCTION OF FORCES. HE HAD SAID THAT THE EAST WAS NOW PREPARED TO AGREE THAT, IN THE FIRST STAGE, SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE ASSUMED ONLY BY THE US AND SOVIET UNION. THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT OF A GENERAL CHARACTER IN THE FIRST STAGE, AND WOULD WORK OUT SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS IN THE COURSE OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATION. WESTERN REPS HAD EXPLAINED THEIR POSITION ON PHASING MANY TIMES. THE ESSENCE OF IT WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE TWO SEPARATE AGREEMENTS, NEGOTIATED IN

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SEQUENCE, AND THAT THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS AS TO THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS UNTIL AFTER A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED AND HAD GONE INTO EFFECT.

25. CANADIAN REP CONTINUED THAT, FROM THE OUTSET OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE EAST'S POSITION HAD BEEN THAT NO REDUCTIONS COULD TAKE PLACE UNTIL ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD UNDERTAKEN COMMITMENTS AS TO THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS. THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL SAID THAT THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE "PRECISELY FORMULATED COMMITMENTS" TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN THE SECOND STAGE, "SO THAT, AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTIONS IN BOTH STAGES, ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WOULD HAVE REDUCED THEIR ARMED FORCES BY AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE." THIS STAGE WAS TO TAKE PLACE IN 1977-1978. IN EXPLAINING THE PROPOSAL, AMBASSADOR KHESTOV HAD SAID THAT THE FIRST STAGE COMMITMENT BY THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD "DEFINE THE FINAL

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VOLUME AND TIME SCHEDULE OF THEIR REDUCTIONS" -- IN OTHER WORDS, THAT THEY WOULD UNDERTAKE A "PRECISELY FORMULATED COMMITMENT" AS TO THE SIZE AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS. IN WHAT RESPECT WAS THIS A MOVE IN THE WEST'S DIRECTION OR A CHANGE IN THE EAST'S ORIGINAL POSITION?

26. CANADIAN REP SAID THAT, ON ANOTHER POINT, EASTERN REPS CLAIMED TO HAVE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE

FLANK COUNTRIES IN PUTTING FORWARD THE PROPOSAL TO DISBAND  
UNITS WITHDRAWN FROM THE AREA. WHAT WAS MEANT BY DISBANDMENT  
AND HOW WOULD ACTION OF THIS KIND TAKE ACCOUNT OF SECURITY  
INTERESTS OF FLANK PARTICIPANTS?

27 CANADIAN REP SAID THAT, TURNING TO ANOTHER ASPECT OF  
THE EASTERN PROPOSALS, WITH REGARD TO FIRST STAGE REDUCTIONS,  
THE EAST'S PROPOSAL SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD REDUCE  
EITHER TWO OR THREE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MANPOWER OF THE ARMED  
FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES IN THE AREA. BUT EASTERN  
REPS HAD NOT TOLD THE WEST EITHER HOW MANY MEN THE SOVIET  
UNION WOULD REDUCE IN STAGE ONE, OR WHAT WAS THE TOTAL NUMBER  
OF MEN IN THE WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE AREA ON WHICH THE  
EAST'S PERCENTAGE FIGURES WERE BASED. QUITE ASIDE FROM OTHER  
ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, HOW COULD THE WEST BE IN A  
POSITION TO KNOW WHAT REDUCTIONS THE EAST ACTUALLY HAD IN  
MIND IF EASTERN REPS WERE NOT WILLING TO PROVIDE DATA? THE  
EAST HAD QUESTIONED WESTERN DATA. USING THEIR OWN DATA,  
WESTERN REPS COULD OF COURSE CALCULATE WHAT 2 PERCENT OR  
3 PERCENT OF THE EASTERN TOTAL WOULD BE. BUT EASTERN REPS HAD  
QUESTIONED THESE DATA. THIS MEANT THE WEST'S CALCULATION  
WOULD APPARENTLY PRODUCE A DIFFERENT REDUCTION FIGURE FROM THE  
EAST'S CALCULATION. BUT EASTERN REPS HAD BEEN UNWILLING TO GIVE THE  
WEST THEIR TOTAL FIGURE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHERE THE  
WEST DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY MEN THE EAST ACTUALLY PROPOSED TO  
REDUCE, IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR ALLIED REPS TO UNDERSTAND  
EXACTLY WHAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL MEANT.

28. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW  
COMMENTS ON POINTS JUST MADE BY CANADIAN REP. EASTERN  
REPS HAD ALREADY HAD AN OPPORTUNITY IN THE LAST INFORMAL  
SESSION AND IN THE LAST PLENARY TO EXPLAIN THE CONTENT AND  
THE GENERAL MEANING OF THE NEW SOCIALIST PROPOSAL AND TO  
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DISCUSS THOSE OF ITS ASPECTS WHICH MADE IT A MUTUALLY  
ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR ACHIEVING RESULTS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.  
CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID HE WOULD NOW TRY IN CONNECTION WITH  
THIS PROPOSAL TO SUPPLY SOME FURTHER EXPLANATIONS OF IT  
AND TO DESCRIBE SOME OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS. HE  
HOPED THAT CANADIAN REP WOULD FIND THE ANSWERS TO SOME OF  
HIS QUESTIONS IN THESE REMARKS.

29. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT A FACT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE  
FOR REACHING PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA TALKS WAS THE READINESS  
OF THE EASTERN STATES TO CONCLUDE A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON  
THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND US FORCES IN A FIRST STAGE.  
EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD ALWAYS CONSIDERED, AND THEY  
CONTINUED TO DO SO, THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE  
NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES AT THE

SAME TIME. TO DO SO WOULD GUARANTEE AN EQUITABLE APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS AND WOULD FULLY CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLES AGREED IN THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS. HOWEVER, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, AND IN ORDER TO REACH AN AGREEMENT, EASTERN REPS HAD GIVEN THEIR CONSENT TO A SEQUENCE OF REDUCTIONS IN WHICH THE US AND THE USSR WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A FIRST STAGE IN 1976 AND THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD DO SO IN THE FOLLOWING STAGE OR STAGES (SIC) IN 1977-1978.

EASTERN REPS HAD MET THE DESIRES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES THAT THE US AND THE USSR SHOULD FIRST WORK OUT CONCRETE AND DETAILED COMMITMENTS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES, WHEREAS THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD WORK OUT COMMITMENTS HAVING ONLY GENERAL CHARACTER. AS BEFORE, EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT THE MOST EQUITABLE APPROACH WOULD BE TO DECIDE ON EQUITABLE REDUCTIONS BY ALL PARTICIPANTS AND HAVE THEM TAKE PLACE AT THE SAME TIME. IN THAT CASE, EACH DIRECT PARTICIPATING STATE WOULD KNOW WHEN IMPLEMENTING ITS OWN REDUCTIONS IN ALL DETAIL WHAT OBLIGATIONS HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN BY THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. NONETHELESS, GUIDED BY THE DESIRE TO MAKE PROGRESS, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE DESIRES OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN THIS RESPECT. EASTERN REPS HOPED THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ASSUME OBLIGATIONS OF GENERAL CHARACTER DEFINING SOLELY THE TIME AND FINAL SCOPE OF THE REDUCTIONS

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OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A CLEAR PROSPECT FOR THE FINAL SOLUTION FOR THE PROBLEMS BY WHICH PARTICIPANTS WERE CONFRONTED. WITHOUT COMMITMENTS OF THIS KIND, MINIMAL AS TO THEIR CONTENT, ONE COULD HARDLY SPEAK OF MUTUAL REDUCTIONS BY THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

30. CZECHOSLOVAK REP CONTINUED THAT, AS EASTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT, WESTERN REPS HAD ADMITTED THROUGH THEIR DECEMBER 16 PROPOSAL PROVIDING FOR THE REDUCTION OF A CERTAIN PORTION OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THAT A REDUCTION

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AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 9 MBFR VIENNA 0071

FROM US REP MBFR

AGREEMENT WOULD BE INCOMPLETE IF IT DID NOT INCLUDE  
REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS WAS A POSITIVE  
FACT. IT WAS ONLY REGRETTABLE THAT THE WEST HAD COME  
TO TALK OF IT AFTER TWO YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS HAD  
ELAPSED AND SO MUCH TIME HAD BEEN WASTED. AFTER ALL,  
THIS POINT HAD ALREADY BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED THROUGH THE  
COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 28, 1973. BUT, HOWEVER LATE, THE  
WEST HAD FINALLY MOVED TO TAKE SOME ACCOUNT OF THE NEED  
TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS ALTHOUGH NOT TO AN ADEQUATE  
EXTENT. BUT THIS PROPOSAL TO REDUCE A CERTAIN  
PART OF US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS ONLY  
WAS INSUFFICIENT. THIS WAS WHY EASTERN REPS HAD PROPOSED  
REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS--NOT MERELY ON A ONE-  
TIME BASIS BY ONE DIRECT PARTICIPATING STATE--BUT BY ALL  
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WHICH EITHER HAD WARHEADS OR MEANS OF  
DELIVERY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. REDUCTIONS OF THIS TYPE  
OF ARMAMENT SHOULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT BY THE US ALONE  
OR BY THE US AND USSR ALONE, LEAVING OTHERS WITH THE  
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POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING THE SAME FORCES. IT WAS IN-  
DISPUTABLE THAT ALL THOSE HAVING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR SOME  
COMPONENT OF THEM IN THE AREA SHOULD REDUCE THEM.

31. CZECHOSLAVAK REP SAID THAT IT FOLLOWED FROM EXPLANATIONS

OF EASTERN REPS THAT THE SOCIALIST STATES HAD GONE FAR TO MEET THE DESIRES OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS AND HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION ON SEQUENCE OF REDUCTIONS AND IN DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE US AND USSR AND THOSE TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE FIRST STAGE. THESE POINTS DEMONSTRATED FULLY THE COMPROMISE CHARACTER OF THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL. EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT THEY HAD PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT SOLVE THE TASK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IF THEY TRIED TO EXCLUDE AIR FORCES FROM REDUCTIONS OR APPLIED THE ASYMMETRICAL METHOD OF REDUCTIONS. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES MUST UNDERSTAND THAT EASTERN PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS APPROACH BECAUSE IT WOULD ENDANGER THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST STATES.

32. CZECHOSLOVAK REP CONTINUED THAT REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS ON THE BASIS OF MUTUALITY WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO THE SECURITY OF ANY WOULD ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF EUROPE AND OF ALL STATES INCLUDING THE FLANKS. ACTUAL REDUCTIONS WERE THE MAIN FACTOR WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THIS ENHANCEMENT. FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, EASTERN REPS HAD ALWAYS BASED THEIR POSITION ON THIS POINT. IF EASTERN REPS NOW PROPOSED THAT FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND ALSO DISBANDED, HERE THEY WERE MAKING AN ADDITIONAL STEP TO MEET THE INTERESTS OF THE FLANKS. THIS PROPOSAL MEANT THAT UNITS OF FOREIGN FORCES WITHDRAWN FROM THE AREA WHICH WOULD BE DISBANDED WOULD CEASE TO EXIST. IF PARTICIPANTS CONSIDERED THIS MEASURE IN AN OBJECTIVE SPIRIT, THEY MUST RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH A MEASURE COULD PROMOTE PROGRESS AND TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE WISHES OF ALL PARTICIPANTS.

33. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT, IF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TOOK A  
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FAVORABLE STAND TOWARD THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE  
IN THE PRESENT ROUND TO START TO WORK OUT A PHASE I AGREEMENT. THEY COULD WORK OUT THE SPECIFIC REDUCTION COMMITMENTS FOR THE US AND USSR AND THE MORE GENERAL, ALTHOUGH CLEARLY FORMULATED, COMMITMENTS OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WHICH WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO FREEZE THEIR FORCES AND TO REDUCE THEM IN THE FOLLOWING STAGE. THE ELABORATION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD GIVE THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS A CONCRETE CHARACTER AND PERMIT SOLUTION OF SPECIFIC PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, LEADING TO A SECOND STAGE WHERE PARTICIPANTS

COULD DEVELOP CONCRETE COMMITMENTS FOR A SECOND REDUCTION.

34. FRG REP SAID HE HAD A QUESTION ABOUT WHAT THE EASTERN REPS CALLED MORE GENERAL BUT CLEARLY FORMULATED COMMITMENTS BY THE NON-SOVIET AND NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN A FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT. AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, THESE MORE GENERAL COMMITMENTS WOULD INCLUDE COMMITMENTS OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT TO REDUCE A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE OF THEIR FORCES, FOR EXAMPLE 15 PERCENT. THIS WOULD MEAN NOT ONLY A PERCENT COMMITMENT BUT IN FACT AN ABSOLUTE NUMBER. THIS WAS BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IN TERMS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO HAVE A FIRST STAGE OF US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS BASED ON 2 OR 3 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL FORCES ON EACH SIDE WITHOUT PARTICIPANTS KNOWING WHAT THOSE TOTAL FORCES WERE. THEREFORE, A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE FORCES BY A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE WOULD IN EFFECT BE EQUIVALENT TO A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE AN ABSOLUTE NUMBER OF FORCES ON THE BASIS OF THE TOTALS WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED FOR A STAGE 1.

35. FRG REP SAID THAT, SECOND, HE ASSUMED FROM EASTERN EXPLANATIONS THAT THESE MORE GENERAL COMMITMENTS WOULD INCLUDE A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE OF ALL ARMED FORCES, GROUND FORCES, AIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AND, THIRD, THAT

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FROM US REP MBFR

THE GENERAL COMMITMENT AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT WOULD BE A NATIONAL COMMITMENT BY EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT WHICH WOULD AS A RESULT LEAD TO NATIONAL CEILINGS. FOURTH, EASTERN REPS STATED IN THEIR PROPOSAL THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE BY UNITS IN THE FIRST STAGE. HE ASSUMED THIS CONDITION WOULD ALSO APPLY TO THE SECOND STAGE. FIFTH, THESE PARTICIPANTS WOULD PRESUMABLY HAVE TO SPECIFY WHEN THEY WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES, THAT IS TO SAY, IN THE PROPOSED YEARS 1977-78. IF ALL THIS WERE THE CASE, WHAT WOULD BE LEFT TO NEGOTIATE IN THE SECOND STAGE? IF THE SO-CALLED GENERAL COMMITMENT CONTAINS ALL THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY FOR AN AGREEMENT, WHAT WOULD BE LEFT TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT AFTERWARDS? THEREFORE, IF NOT IN FORM, THEN IN SUBSTANCE, THE EAST STILL ADHERED TO THE CONCEPT THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ENTER INTO REDUCTION COMMITMENTS FROM THE OUTSET. ONLY THE IMPLEMENTATION WOULD BE DEFERRED. ONE PART WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN SECRET

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1976 AND THE SECOND PART IN 1977-78.

36. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME COMMENTS DEALING IN PARTICULAR WITH SOME OF THE POINTS JUST MADE BY THE CANADIAN REP. FIRST, THE CANADIAN REP HAD BEGUN BY ASKING WHAT MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION HAD BEEN REFLECTED IN THE LATEST EASTERN PROPOSAL. THEN CANADIAN REP HAD PROCEED TO ENUMERATE NEARLY ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF REDUCTIONS. HE HAD ASKED WHETHER THE EAST WAS ACCEPTING SUCH ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION AS THE ASYMMETRICAL NATURE OF THE REDUCTIONS, COLLECTIVE CEILINGS, THE TWO-PHASE MODE OF REDUCTIONS, SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO STAGE 1 OF THE REDUCTIONS, GENERAL OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO STAGE 2, AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION, IN FACT, PRACTICALLY ALL ITS ELEMENTS. BUT EASTERN REPS HAD NEVER INDICATED THAT THEY WERE READY TO ACCEPT THE ENTIRE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS OR ALL ELEMENTS OF THIS OUTLINE. THEY HAD GIVEN THEIR REASONS FOR NOT WISHING TO DO SO. IN THE PRESENT SESSION, THE POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK REPS HAD RECALLED



TO A CERTAIN EXTENT THE ARGUMENTS THE EASTERN REPS HAD GIVEN. THEY HAD EXPLAINED WHY THE EASTERN REPS HAD CONSIDERED A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS TOUCHED ON BY THE CANADIAN AND FRG REPS COULD NOT CREATE THE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT AND ALSO CONTRADICTED THOSE AGREED PRINCIPLES WHICH MUST SERVE AS A BASIS FOR AGREEMENT.

37. KHESTOV SAID THE FIRST MAJOR ELEMENT RAISED BY THE CANADIAN REP AND TOUCHED ON BY THE FRG REP AS WELL AS HAD BEEN THE CONCEPT OF DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES. EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT THIS CONCEPT WAS WITHOUT ANY JUSTIFICATION. THIS WAS NOT BECAUSE THEY DID NOT HAPPEN TO LIKE THE WORD DISPARITY, BUT BECAUSE EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT THIS CONCEPT HAD BEEN WORKED OUT ARTIFICIALLY BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AND DID NOT REFLECT THE REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS.

38. KHESTOV SAID HE DID NOT SEE ANY NECESSITY TO REPEAT ALL THE POINTS MADE BEFORE ON THIS SUBJECT. HE  
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WISHED TO REMIND THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ONLY THAT, FIRST OF ALL, IT WAS AN UNQUESTIONABLE TRUTH THAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE HAD TO BE EVALUATED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL ARMED SERVICES LOCATED THERE. THIS MEANT NOT ONLY GROUND FORCES BUT ALSO AIR FORCES AND ALL KINDS OF ARMAMENTS INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ONE COULD NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ONLY ONE ARMED SERVICE. SECONDLY, THE WEST HAD INCLUDED IN AN ARTIFICIAL WAY IN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE EASTERN COUNTRIES CERTAIN FORCE COMPONENTS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN INCLUDED BY NATO IN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES. SUCH AN APPROACH WAS INCORRECT AND THE WESTERN REPS KNEW THIS VERY WELL. THIS MEANT THAT ONE OF THE MAIN WESTERN POSITIONS, THE POSITION WHICH CONSTITUTED THE FOUNDATION OF THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH, COULD NOT BE DEFENDED FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF LOGIC AND ARGUMENTATION.

39. KHESTOV SAID A SECOND ELEMENT USED IN THE FOUNDATION OF THE WESTERN POSITION WAS THE SO-CALLED GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR. IN THE PRESENT SESSION, WHILE EXPLAINING THE WESTERN VIEW ON THIS TOPIC, THE FRG REP HAD ASSERTED THAT IT SEEMED TO THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS AS THOUGH THE EAST WERE TRYING TO SEPARATE THIS AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE FROM THE REALITIES OF THE SURROUNDING AREA. TO THIS, HE WISHED TO SAY THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING THAT MEASURES TO REDUCE ARMED FORCES TO BE WORKED OUT IN THESE TALKS WOULD BE APPLIED TO THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE,

THT IS TO THE AREA DEFINED BY PARTICIPANTS. DESPITE THAT, WESTERN REPS WERE TRYING TO ANALYZE THE MILITARY POTENTIAL EXISTING OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARIES OF THE REDUCTION AREA. IN THIS CASE, TOO, THE WESTERN REPS WERE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ONLY ONE ELEMENT: THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE BETWEEN SOVIET TERRITORY IN THE AREA AND GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE OF AMERICAN TERRITORY FROM THE AREA.

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THE EASTERN REPS HAD REPEATEDLY INDICATED THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR STUDYING THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE REDUCTION AREA OR EVEN FOR THAT MATTER, THE OVERALL MILITARY POTENTIAL OF COUNTRIES INSIDE THE AREA. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WAS TO WORK OUT MEASURES TO REDUCE ARMED FORCES INSIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. WHEN, DESPITE THIS, THE WESTERN REPS HAD MADE USE OF THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR, EASTERN REPS HAD DEMONSTRATED TO THE WEST THAT EMPHASIS ON THIS SINGLE ELEMENT, AN ELEMENT

CONNECTED WITH WHAT WAS STATIONED OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARIES OF THE AREA, WAS NOT A JUSTIFIABLE OR SCIENTIFICALLY VALID METHOD.

40. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, EASTERN REPS HAD PRESENTED DETAILED ARGUMENTS TO SHOW THAT THESE TWO ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION, THE CONCEPT OF DISPARITY OF GROUND  
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FORCES AND THE CONCEPT OF THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR, WERE NOT JUSTIFIABLE CONCEPTS AND THAT IT WAS CONSEQUENTLY NOT POSSIBLE TO USE THEM AS A BASIS FOR AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT IN THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. THE WESTERN REPS HAD FAILED TO GIVE THE EAST PROOF OR ARGUMENTS WHICH WOULD OVERCOME THE EASTERN ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CONCEPTS OF DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES AND THE THEORY OF GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR.

41. KHLESTOV SAID THIS WAS WHY THE EASTERN REPS WISHED TO EXPRESS THEIR REGRET THAT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS CONTINUED TO ADHERE TO THE SAME POINT OF VIEW ON THESE TWO ISSUES AND WERE CONTINUING TO BASE THEIR PROPOSAL ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS ON THESE UNJUSTIFIED CONCEPTS. AS THE CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD EXPLAINED EARLIER IN THE PRESENT SESSION, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD ALWAYS CONSIDERED THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES SHOULD REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES AT THE SAME TIME. BUT THEY HAD TRIED TO MEET THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WITH REGARD TO THE TWO-PHASE APPROACH TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMEMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. AS THE EASTERN REPS SAW IT, THEY HAD EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO DEAL WITH THIS ELEMENT OF THE WESTERN APPROACH ONLY BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT THIS IDEA, ACCORDING TO WHICH THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES SHOULD BE STARTED BY THE US AND USSR AND ONLY AFTER THAT BE FOLLOWED BY REDUCTIONS BY THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, CONSTITUTED AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE WESTERN APPROACH. THIS WAS WHY THE EASTERN REPS BELIEVED THAT, ON THE BASIS OF OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS, THE WESTERN REPS COULD IN FACT SEE THAT THE EAST HAD TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION THIS POINT OF VIEW OF THE WESTERN SIDE.

42. KHLESTOV SAID, A FURTHER QUESTION HAD BEEN RAISED, CONCERNING THE GENERAL AND SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE U.S. BOTH CANADIAN AND FRG REPS HAD POSED QUESTIONS AIMED AT SHOWING THAT THE GENERAL OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE

EASTERN PROPOSAL WERE VERY CLOSE TO OR AMOUNTED TO A  
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SPECIFIC REDUCTION OBLIGATION AND THAT THIS FACT WAS  
CONTRARY TO THE WESTERN POSITION. IN CONNECTION WITH THESE  
OBSERVATIONS, HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE IN MORE DETAIL BOTH WHAT  
THE ORIGINAL EASTERN POSITION HAD BEEN AND WHAT HAD BEEN  
DONE IN THE NEW EASTERN POSITION.

43. KHLESTOV SAID THE ESSENCE OF THE ORIGINAL EASTERN POSITION  
HAD BEEN, AND EASTERN REPS STILL CONSIDERED IT CORRECT, THAT ALL  
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS OF THEIR ARMED  
FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY FROM THE OUTSET. THIS MEANT THAT  
EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT COUNTRY WOULD REDUCE ITS ARMED  
FORCES FROM THE VERY OUTSET BY A SPECIFIED NUMBER AND  
THAT THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE REDUCING  
SIMULTANEOUSLY. THAT IS, DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS,  
EASTERN REPS HAD FOCUSED ON THE POINT THAT ALL DIRECT  
PARTICIPANT COUNTRIES SHOULD REDUCE  
THEIR ARMED FORCES FROM THE VERY BEGINNING AND BY A  
SPECIFIC AMOUNT AND TOGETHER, AND NOT MERELY ON THE POINT  
THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD FROM THE VERY OUTSET  
ASSUME SOME REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS. NOW, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL  
HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE APPROACH ADVOCATED BY THE WESTERN  
COUNTRIES. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD INDICATED THEIR  
READINESS IN THE FIRST STAGE TO REDUCE ONLY US AND SOVIET  
FORCES AND THAT ONLY THESE TWO COUNTRIES WOULD ASSUME SPECIFIC  
OBLIGATIONS. THIS MEANT THAT EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD USED ONE  
ELEMENT OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL IN THEIR NEW PROPOSAL THAT  
A FIRST REDUCTION BE CARRIED OUT ONLY BY THE US AND USSR IN  
1976. EASTERN REPS WERE PREPARED TO AGREE THAT A FIRST STAGE  
AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDED FOR SOVIET AND US REDUCTIONS SHOULD  
CONTAIN SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR THEIR REDUCTIONS ALONE. AS FOR  
THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, EASTERN REPS HAD ALSO ADOPTED  
A SECOND ELEMENT OF THE WESTERN POSITION, TO THE  
EFFECT THAT, IN THE FIRST AGREEMENT, THE REMAINING DIRECT  
PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ASSUME ONLY GENERAL OBLIGATIONS. WESTERN  
REPS HAD REPEATEDLY INDICATED THAT THESE GENERAL OBLIGATIONS  
BY THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE FIRST  
PHASE AGREEMENT AND ALSO THAT THE NATURE OF THESE GENERAL  
OBLIGATIONS SHOULD BE THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE  
NEGOTIATIONS OTHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US  
SHOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH A CERTAIN LEVEL FOR THEIR  
FORCES AND TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES TO THAT CEILING OR LEVEL.

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44. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT THIS MEANT THE GENERAL OBLIGATION PROPOSED BY THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO BE ASSUMED BY THE REMAINING PARTICIPANTS WAS TO REDUCE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES TO A LEVEL WHICH HAD BEEN INDICATED BY WESTERN REPS IN TERMS OF NUMBERS. THE SAME IDEA WAS INCLUDED IN THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL.

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THE ONLY DIFFERENCE WAS THAT THE LEVEL TO WHICH FORCES OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE REDUCED WAS INDICATED IN PERCENTAGES AND THAT THE WORDS "EQUAL PERCENTAGES" WERE USED IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. A FURTHER DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO POSITIONS WAS THAT WESTERN REPS CAME OUT FOR THE COLLECTIVE CEILING AND EAST FAVORED OBLIGATIONS TAKEN BY EACH COUNTRY. WESTERN REPS KNEW VERY WELL WHY THE EAST OPPOSED COLLECTIVE CEILINGS.

45. KHLESTOV SAID FRG REP HAD POSED A QUESTION EARLIER

IN THE SESSION CONCERNING THE TIME THE EAST PROPOSED FOR ITS SECOND STAGE, 1977-78. THE FRG REP HAD SAID THAT THE WESTERN VERSION OF THE GENERAL OBLIGATION CONCERNING A SECOND STAGE REDUCTION DID NOT PROVIDE FOR TIMING OF REDUCTIONS, BUT THAT SUCH TIMING WAS PROVIDED FOR IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS OBSERVATION, KHLESTOV HAD A QUESTION: WHY DIDN'T WESTERN REPS LIKE THE IDEA OF INCLUDING A SPECIFIC SECRET

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TIMING, 1977-78, IF THEY REALLY WANTED TO REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES? EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT THE PERIOD OF TIME THEY HAD PROVIDED FOR SOVIET UNION AND US FORCES IN THE FIRST STAGE WAS QUITE SUFFICIENT AND AFTER THAT, PARTICIPANTS COULD HAVE TWO MORE YEARS. THIS WOULD BE QUITE SUFFICIENT TO CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS OF THE REMAINING PARTICIPANTS.

THIS WAS WHY HE DREW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT WESTERN REPS APPARENTLY CONSIDERED AS A DRAWBACK OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL THE FACT THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY 1978. THIS QUESTION WORRIED HIM. HE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR THE VIEWS OF WESTERN REPS AS TO WHAT TIME PERIOD THEY HAD IN MIND FOR PHASE II REDUCTIONS AND WITHIN WHAT PERIOD THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE ALL OTHER PARTICIPANTS COMPLETE THEIR REDUCTIONS IF PARTICIPANTS PROCEEDED IN THE WAY THE WEST PROPOSED.

46. KHLESTOV SAID CANADIAN REP HAD REPEATED THE QUESTION IN THE PRESENT SESSION WHICH HAD BEEN PUT BY US REP EARLIER. US REP HAD ASKED THE QUESTION AS TO WHICH OF THE INDICATED PERCENTAGES EASTERN REP HAD IN MIND, 2 OR 3 PERCENT. TO THIS HE WISHED TO SAY THAT IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT ANY UNDERSTANDINGS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE REACHED ONLY AS A RESULT OF MUTUAL AGREEMENT. THIS MEANT THAT THE SPECIFIC PERCENTAGES OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET FORCES TO BE REDUCED WITHIN THE FIRST STAGE WOULD BE DEFINED WITHIN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES. AS EASTERN REPS SAW IT, THE PROPOSAL TO CARRY OUT EITHER 2 OR 3 PERCENT OF THE WHOLE ARMED FORCES WAS A FURTHER DEMONSTRATION OF THE FLEXIBLE APPROACH TAKEN BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THE EAST WAS READY TO REDUCE ITS FORCES IN THE FIRST STAGE BY EITHER PERCENTAGE ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY.

47. KHLESTOV SAID CANADIAN REP HAD ALSO REPEATED A FURTHER QUESTION RAISED BY US REP. THIS CONCERNED THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF SOVIET FORCES TO BE REDUCED IF THE WEST AGREED TO REDUCTION OF 3 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL. IN THIS CONNECTION, EASTERN REP WISHED TO UNDERLINE THAT

IT WAS NOT ONLY AN ISSUE OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF  
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THE SOVIET FORCES TO BE REDUCED BUT ALSO OF AMERICAN FORCES. IN THE EASTERN VIEW, IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO TO FIX THIS STRENGTH IN A LATER STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AFTER THERE WAS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

48. KHESTOV SAID FRG REP HAD EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT THE EAST TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES. HE BELIEVED THE REASON THIS QUESTION HAD BEEN ASKED WAS THAT WESTERN REP HAD NOT EXAMINED THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL THOROUGHLY AND DEEPLY ENOUGH. HE WISHED TO INDICATE ONLY ONE ASPECT TO SHOW THE OUTCOME OF THE PROPOSAL IF IT WERE ADOPTED. THE PURPOSE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS TO DECREASE THE CONFRONTATION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS DECREASE SHOULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL ONE. AS A RESULT OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, THE NUMBER OF ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA WOULD BE REDUCED, BOTH THE FORCES OF COUNTRIES SITUATED INSIDE THE AREA AND THOSE OUTSIDE THE AREA. HE BELIEVED BOTH THE REDUCED LEVEL OF CONFRONTATION OF FORCES, THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES FROM THE AREA, PLUS AN OBLIGATION NOT TO RE-INTRODUCE THE SOVIET FORCES INTO THE AREA WOULD IN FACT SERVE TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF THE WEST. QUITE NATURALLY, EASTERN REPS PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE WEST WOULD RECIPROCATATE. THIS WOULD SERVE TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF THE EAST. THAT IS WHY EASTERN REPS BELIEVED THAT THEIR PROPOSAL WOULD SERVE TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS AND THIS WAS WHY IT WAS AN EQUITABLE PROPOSAL.

49. KHESTOV APOLOGIZED FOR THE LENGTH OF HIS REMARKS. IT HAD BEEN RATHER DIFFICULT TO COPE WITH ALL THE QUESTIONS THAT HAD BEEN RAISED, BUT HE BELIEVED THAT EXPLANATIONS GIVEN DURING THE PRESENT SESSION HAD SHOWN THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL.

50. FRG REP REFERRED TO HIS QUESTION ON TIMING. ITS OBJECT HAD BEEN TO FIND OUT THE NATURE OF THE GENERAL COMMITMENTS TO BE ASSUMED BY THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE FIRST STAGE. HE HAD NOT ASKED ABOUT OR COMMENTED ON THE TIME-FRAME FOR THE CARRYING OUT OF THESE OBLIGATIONS. HE HAD NOT DONE SO BECAUSE THIS WAS ONE OF THE FEW ELEMENTS OF THE NEW  
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SOCIALIST PROPOSAL WHICH WAS VERY CLEAR.

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

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R 261017Z FEB 76

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1457

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

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FROM US REP MBFR

51. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, U.S. REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SUM UP WHERE THE WEST SAW DISCUSSION STOOD. ON DEC 16, THE WEST HAD PUT FORWARD IMPORTANT NEW PROPOSALS. THE ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF US NUCLEAR WARHEADS, NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, AND SURFACE-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS WHICH THE ALLIES HAD OFFERED WERE OF GREAT MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. THE WEST'S DEC 16 PROPOSALS ALSO PROVIDED AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION TO THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATING PROBLEM PARTICIPANTS WERE FACED WITH. ON THE ONE HAND, THEY MET THE ESSENTIAL WESTERN REQUIREMENT THAT AN AGREEMENT DEAL CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE BASIC SECURITY PROBLEM IN CENTRAL EUROPE BY DEALING WITH THE DESTABILIZING IMBALANCE IN GROUND FORCES. AND THESE INEQUALITIES WERE NOT WESTERN CONCEPTS -- THEY WERE ACTUAL FACTS WITH WHICH ANY AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO DEAL CONSTRUCTIVELY.



52. US REP CONTINUED THAT, ON THE OTHER HAND, WITH THE ADDITION OF THE WESTERN OFFER TO REDUCE AND LIMIT US TACTICAL NUCLEAR  
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WEAPONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE ALLIED PROPOSALS CLEARLY OFFSET THE LARGER EASTERN GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS WHICH THE WEST WAS ASKING FOR. WHEN EVERYTHING WAS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, AND BY THAT US REP SAID HE EXPRESSLY REFERRED TO THE LIMITATIONS AND THE IMPACT OF THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR ON THESE LIMITATIONS, BOTH OF WHICH POLISH REP HAD NOT CONSIDERED IN HIS ANALYSIS, WHEN ALL THIS WAS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, THEN WHAT THE ALLIES WERE OFFERING TO DO ON THE WESTERN SIDE WAS AT LEAST EQUAL TO WHAT THE WEST WAS ASKING FOR FROM THE EAST. THEREFORE, IT COULD NOT BE REALISTICALLY CONTENDED THAT THE AGREEMENT THE ALLIES PROPOSED WOULD GIVE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO THE WEST AT THE EXPENSE OF EASTERN SECURITY. THE ALLIED PROPOSALS WERE ON THE TABLE AND WESTERN REPS LOOKED FOR A MORE POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE THAN THEY HAD HEARD AS YET.

53. US REP SAID THAT THE WEST WAS STUDYING THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS CLAIMED THAT THIS PROPOSAL HAD MANY CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS WHICH THEY HAD FURTHER DESCRIBED IN THE PRESENT SESSION. US REP REGRETTED TO SAY THAT, EVEN INCLUDING TODAY'S EXPLANATIONS, AS FAR AS THE WEST WAS CONCERNED, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD NOT YET SHOWN THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL IN FACT MET ANY MAJOR WESTERN INTERESTS OR THAT IT DEPARTED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE ORIGINAL EASTERN PROPOSALS. FINALLY, US REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO STRESS AGAIN THE NEED FOR DATA RELEVANT TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. THE EAST WAS PROPOSING REDUCTIONS BY PERCENTAGES OF AN UNSPECIFIED WHOLE. IF EASTERN REPS REALLY WERE SERIOUS ABOUT HIS PROPOSAL, THEN THEY SHOULD AT LEAST BE WILLING TO GIVE THE WEST THE RELEVANT FACTUAL INFORMATION ABOUT IT. IT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY TO SAY THAT DATA WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE AFTER A REDUCTION APPROACH HAD BEEN AGREED ON. TO UNDERSTAND ANY REDUCTION APPROACH, PARTICIPANTS HAD TO KNOW THE BASIC FACT, WHICH WAS, HOW MANY REDUCTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE UNDER THAT APPROACH.

54. FRG REP PROPOSED THAT PARTICIPANTS ADJOURN THE MEETING AND AGREE TO MEET ON TUESDAY, MARCH 2. KHLESTOV SUGGESTED THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE NEXT INFORMAL SESSION BE A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS AS HE SAID HAD BEEN AGREED WHEN PARTICIPANTS UNDERTOOK TO HAVE TWO INFORMALS IN SUCCESSION ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES. US REP SAID THAT HE THOUGHT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD HAVE ANOTHER  
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MEETING ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES INASMUCH AS THERE WERE A NUMBER OF POINTS, IN PARTICULAR, SOME OF THESE WHICH POLISH REP HAD MADE, WHICH THE WEST WOULD LIKE TO RESPOND TO BUT HAD REFRAINED FROM DOING SO IN VIEW OF THE LATENESS OF THE HOUR. HE SAID THE WEST HAD NOTHING NEW TO SAY ON DEFINITIONS.

55. KHLESTOV SAID THAT HE FELT THAT SEEKING AGREEMENT ON A FORCE DEFINITION WAS A NECESSARY AND IMPORTANT ACTIVITY. IT HAD BEEN THE USUAL PROCEDURE TO DEVOTE ALTERNATE MEETINGS TO THE GENERAL QUESTIONS AND TO FORCE DEFINITIONS. THE EAST HAS YIELDED TO THE WEST'S WISHES IN DEVOTING TWO SUCCESSIVE MEETINGS TO GENERAL MATTERS. HE RECOMMENDED THAT PARTICIPANTS NOW AGREE TO A REGULAR ROTATION AS HAD BEEN THE CUSTOM IN THE FALL SESSION. WHEN POLISH REP HAD MADE THE COMPROMISE PROPOSAL TO HOLD THE TWO GENERAL TOPIC MEETINGS, THE EAST HAD THE FEELING THAT THE WEST BELIEVED THE EAST DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS GENERAL MATTERS. IT WAS NOW CLEAR THAT THE EAST HAD DISCUSSED THEM ACTIVELY. THE EAST WOULD ALSO BE WILLING TO CONTINUE TO DISCUSS GENERAL MATTERS, BUT FELT THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD RE-ESTABLISH THE PREVIOUS ROTATION SYSTEM.

55. CANADIAN REP POINTED OUT THAT, SINCE THE POLISH REP'S COMPROMISE HAD BEEN ADOPTED, THE EAST HAD INTRODUCED ITS NEW PROPOSAL AND THAT BOTH SIDES HAD INTRODUCED NEW PROPOSALS SINCE THE TIME WHEN THE SYSTEM ON ALTERNATE MEETINGS HAD LAST BEEN FOLLOWED. ACCORDINGLY, THE SITUATION WAS A NEW ONE. HE SUGGESTED PARTICIPANTS SHOULD CONTINUE WITH THE GENERAL MATTERS, PARTICULARLY WHILE THERE WERE OPEN QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED. POLISH REP THEN PRESSED FOR ADOPTING THE ROTATION PLAN. SOME QUESTIONS REMAINED UNANSWERED. BUT THIS CONCERNED BOTH SIDES. NEVERTHELESS, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO THINK A LITTLE LONGER ABOUT THE ANSWERS. THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE GOOD TO DEVOTE THE NEXT MEETING TO FORCE DEFINITIONS. TO DO SO WOULD NOT MEAN AVOIDING ANY TOPIC, BUT WOULD ASSURE THAT PARTICIPANTS DID NOT FORGET THE DEFINITIONS.

56. FRG REP SUGGESTED AS A COMPROMISE THAT THE WEST COULD AGREE TO HAVING THE NEXT SESSION ON DEFINITIONS PROVIDED IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT ALLIES HAD NOT AGREED TO RENEW THE ROTATION PLAN. THE EAST PUSHED HARD FOR A RENEWAL OF THE ROTATION SYSTEM, BUT FINALLY AGREED TO FRG REP'S PROPOSAL.

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57. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE NEXT SESSION WOULD TAKE PLACE ON MARCH 2. THE EAST WILL BE HOST.RESOR

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
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